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Abstract
In a parametrized and constrained Hamiltonian system, an observable is an operator which commutes with all (first-class) constraints, including the super-Hamiltonian. The problem of the frozen formalism is to explain how dynamics is possible when all observables are constants of the motion. An explicit model of a measurement-interaction in a parametrized Hamiltonian system is used to elucidate the relationship between three definitions of observables-as something one observes, as self-adjoint operators, and as operators which commute with all of the constraints. There is no inconsistency in the frozen formalism when the measurement process is properly understood. The projection operator description of measurement is criticized as an over-idealization which treats measurement as instantaneous and nondestructive. A more careful description of measurement necessarily involves interactions of non-vanishing duration. This is a first step towards a more even-handed treatment of space and time in quantum mechanics.
There is a special talent in being able to ask simple questions whose answers reach deeply into our understanding of physics. Dieter is one of the people with this talent, and many was the time when I thought the answer to one of his questions was nearly at hand, only to lose it on meeting an unexpected conceptual pitfall. Each time, I had come to realize that if only I could answer the question, there were several interlocking issues I would understand more clearly. In this essay, I will address such a question posed to me by others sharing Dieter's talent:
What is the difference between an observable and what we observe?
This question arises in the context of parametrized Hamiltonian systems, of which canonical quantum gravity is perhaps the most famous example. It is posed to resolve the following paradox: For constrained Hamiltonian systems, an observable is defined as an operator which commutes (weakly) with all of the (first-class) constraints. In the parametrized canonical formalism, the super-Hamiltonian H describing the evolution of states is itself a constraint. Thus, all observables must commute with the super-Hamiltonian, and so they are all constants of motion. Where then are the dynamics that we see, if not in the observables? This is the problem of the frozen formalism Kuc92] .
In the context of quantum gravity, the problem of the frozen formalism is closely linked with the problem of interpreting the wavefunction of the universe and the problem of time. Two proposed solutions to the problem of time-Rovelli's evolving constants of the motion[Rov89-91] and the conditional probability interpretation of Page and Wootters[PaW83-93]-intimately involve observables which commute with the super-Hamiltonian, and each claims to recover dynamics. These proposals have been strongly criticized by Kuchar[Kuc92] , who notes that there is a problem with the frozen formalism even for the parametrized Newtonian particle.
In this essay, I shall not address the problem of time but will focus on the simpler case of the Newtonian particle. My intention is to reconcile the different conceptions, mathematical and physical, that we have of observables. This will involve a recitation of measurement theory to establish the connection between the physical and the mathematical. Essential features of both the Rovelli and the Page-Wootters approaches will appear in my discussion as aspects of a careful understanding of observables and how we use them.
There is a general consensus that to discuss the wavefunction of the universe one must adopt a post-Everett interpretation of quantum theory in which the observer is treated as part of the full quantum system. I shall take this position for parametrized Hamiltonian systems as well. Insistence that the measurement process must be explicitly modelled will lead to a sharp criticism of the conventional description of measurement in terms of projection operators. A simple model measurement, related to one originally discussed by von Neumann [vNe55] , will clarify the role of observables in the description of measurements. No incompatibility between dynamics and observables which are constants of the motion will be found. With further work, I believe that my discussion can be extended to answer some of the criticisms of Kuchar of the Rovelli and the Page-Wootters proposals on the problem of time.
Before beginning the analysis of observables, return to the formulation of the problem of the frozen formalism. To be assured the problem doesn't lie in the assumptions, consider each of the hypotheses leading up to it. The stated definition of an observable is a sensible one as the following argument shows. In a constrained Hamiltonian system, the set of (first-class) constraints {C i } (i = 1, . . . , N) define a subspace in the full Hilbert space of an unconstrained system. A state Ψ in this subspace satisfies the constraint equations C i Ψ = 0. When Ψ is acted upon by the observable A, one requires that the result AΨ remain in the constrained subspace. The condition for this is [A,
If one were to weaken the definition of an observable by not requiring that it commute with the super-Hamiltonian, as is sometimes done [Kuc92] , then one must deal with the difficult problem of operators whose action takes one out of one's Hilbert space. This is not an adequate strategy for dealing with the problem of the frozen formalism; it trades one problem for a harder one.
If the difficulty is not in this definition of an observable, perhaps it lies in the fact the super-Hamiltonian is a constraint. Constraints are often a consequence of a symmetry underlying the theory. In the ADM canonical quantization of gravity, it is well-known that invariance of the theory under spacetime diffeomorphisms makes the super-Hamiltonian a constraint. In the parametrized canonical formulation of quantum mechanics, reparametrization invariance of the theory makes the super-Hamiltonian a constraint. In both cases, the symmetry making the super-Hamiltonian a constraint is a physically motivated symmetry which is not to be given up lightly.
The problem of the frozen formalism is thus a real one, at least in so far as it reflects a weakness in our understanding. It does not however prevent one from just using the familiar machinery of quantum mechanics. For this reason, it is most often consigned to the limbo of "peculiarities of the quantum formalism," and is either dismissed as a problem in semantics or simply not addressed.
There is without doubt a semantic component to the problem. In common usage, the word "observable" has the connotation "something which can be observed." In ordinary quantum mechanics, it is defined as a selfadjoint operator with complete spectrum. In parametrized and constrained quantum mechanics, it is defined as an operator, not necessarily self-adjoint, which commutes with all of the constraints. The task is to distinguish these meanings. In so doing, we shall find that the problem of the frozen formalism is more subtle than confusing one word with three meanings. It will hinge on how we describe physical measurements in the mathematical formalism of quantum mechanics. I will give an explication of the problem by way of a few examples. These will show that there is no problem with working in the frozen formalism: there are both constant observables and dynamics within the wavefunction of the universe.
The essential property of an observable in both its mathematical definitions is that it has an associated (complete) collection of eigenstates with corresponding eigenvalues. The significance of this is that states can be characterized by the eigenvalues of a collection of commuting observables. The eigenvalues are the quantum numbers of the state. In the parametrized formalism, these eigenvalues characterize the state throughout its entire evolution. This is why they are constants of the motion. If an operator does not commute with the super-Hamiltonian constraint, its eigenstates are not in the constrained Hilbert space and are then of no use for representing states in the constrained Hilbert space.
Because the eigenstates of observables are assumed to be complete, one may represent states as superpositions of eigenstates. The coefficients in the superposition will be constant. It is not necessary to know the observables of which the full state is the eigenstate, though they can be constructed if it is desired.
To firmly establish this perspective on observables, consider the para-metrized free particle with the super-Hamiltonian
Physical states |Ψ are those which satisfy the super-Hamiltonian constraint
The operator p 1 commutes with the super-Hamiltonian and is an observable. Its associated eigenstates may be labelled by the eigenvalue k, where
and, in the coordinate representation (assuming the canonical commutation
The operator q 1 does not commute with the super-Hamiltonian and is not an observable. In particular the state q 1 |k 1 does not satisfy the superHamiltonian constraint. An operator closely related to q 1 which is an observable is
This is the observable which is equal to q 1 at time q 0 = t. It is one of Rovelli's "evolving constants of the motion"[Rov89-91]. Its eigenstates are characterized by q 1t |x 1 = x|x 1 .
In the coordinate representation, this is
This may be recognized as the Green's function for the free particle, which reduces to δ(q 1 − x) as q 0 → t. (The states are normalized using the usual inner product with respect to q 1 , but this won't be discussed here.) A Gaussian superposition of momentum eigenstates can be formed by
This has the coordinate representation
).
An observable of which this state is an eigenstate is found to be
and the state has eigenvalue 2ik/a. Note that G is not self-adjoint in the usual inner product and its eigenvalue is not real. One expects that this means that it is not physically observable, but to confirm this requires a discussion of measurement. Measurement theory in the foundation of quantum mechanics has been discussed exhaustively over the past sixty years. To put the use of observables as self-adjoint operators in context, it is necessary to reiterate the litany. I want to emphasize the central role of projection operators in the conventional approach. In contrast, I want to draw attention to an argument from a new perspective compelling the use of a post-Everett description of measurement in which both system and observing apparatus appear explicitly.
In ordinary quantum mechanics, observables as self-adjoint operators play a central role, again through their eigenstates. The conventional description of measurement is the following: If one intends to measure a particular observable, one decomposes the state of the system into a superposition of eigenstates of that observable. The eigenvalues of these eigenstates of the observable are interpreted as the possible outcomes of the measurement. Since the observables are self-adjoint, the eigenvalues, and hence the outcomes of measurement, are necessarily real. The probabilities for each of the outcomes are given by the square-modulus of the coefficients in the superposition. When the measurement is complete, the state of the system is in an eigenstate of the observable.
This procedure is so ingrained in our understanding of quantum mechanics that one easily forgets that it is a theoretical construct and not the measurement process itself. The procedure is primarily based on two assumptions [Dir58] : 1) measurement of a state gives a particular result with certainty if and only if the system is in an eigenstate of the observable being measured, and the result is the eigenvalue of that eigenstate; 2) from "physical continuity," after a measurement is made, if that measurement is immediately repeated, the same outcome must be obtained with certainty, and, hence, by 1), the measurement must put the system into an eigenstate of the observable. These two assumptions characterize measurements, distinguishing them from other interactions, and are thus the fundamental tie between the physically observed and the mathematically observable, between measurement outcomes and eigenstates of operators. Few would doubt the validity of the assumptions. I do not claim that the procedure does not work, but rather that it works too well.
Let us call this description of measurement "the projection procedure," as one projects the initial state onto the eigenstates of the observable being measured. This projection procedure neatly summarizes the results of measurement, but does so at the cost of neglecting a description of the process by which the measurement is made. It is as if an external agent is able to effect a measurement on the system without need of introducing any apparatus: suddenly, the measurement is done. The description is wholly isolated. Only the system is present, and the measurement has direct access to its state. Unfortunately, we do not share this luxury of direct access to states. By necessity, we must always employ intermediaries to investigate the state of a system.
A question that we are accustomed to ask in quantum mechanics is "What is the probability density that the momentum of particle-1 in state |Ψ 1 is k?"
Suppose the state |Ψ 1 is the gaussian superposition of momentum eigenstates (6) in the example above. The question inquires directly about the state of particle-1, and, in the projection procedure, the question is meaningful and has the familiar answer (πa/2) −1/2 e −2(k−k) 2 /a . This is not however an entirely sensible question in the context of a system described by a superHamiltonian constraint. To verify the answer, we must conduct an experiment. The state solving the super-Hamiltonian constraint is the wavefunction of the universe and contains, along with everything else, all measurements and their outcomes. In fact, no measurements were ever made. The question has no truth value because its answer can be neither confirmed nor denied.
To address the question, additional subsystems must be introduced which interact with particle-1 to produce the measurement. For the purposes of theory, these additional subsystems may be hypothetical, as we need not do every experiment we contemplate, but we must augment the hypothesized super-Hamiltonian as if the experiment were to be performed. In the event that it is, we can then expect to confirm or deny our theoretical result. This treatment of the super-Hamiltonian carries an important resonance with Bohr's insistence that reality is determined by the full experimental arrangement [Boh35] : the choice of experiments determines the superHamiltonian; the super-Hamiltonian (plus initial conditions) determines the wavefunction of the universe and hence reality.
An essential consequence of this is that, to understand the measurement process properly, one must model the interaction. It is not enough to add apparatus subsystems to the super-Hamiltonian if one continues to treat measurement as a black box which spontaneously changes the combined system and apparatus state from an uncorrelated to a correlated superposition. This is essentially still the projection procedure, albeit without the final selection of a particular term from the correlated superposition.
Before investigating such a model explicitly, consider the characteristics it must possess. Our goal is to understand the relation between observables as self-adjoint operators and physical measurements. As the correspondence between them is made through the assumptions underlying the projection procedure, we desire a model which is as close to the projection procedure as possible while being more specific about the details of the interaction. In particular, we require that a measurement of a chosen observable return a result which distinguishes between different eigenstates of the observable and that it have the property that if the measurement is immediately repeated, the same result will be found with certainty. This type of model was discussed by von Neumann [vNe55] and plays an important role in the Everett interpretation [DeG73] . I will discuss it again to emphasize certain features.
If one has an isolated state being observed without apparatus, as in the projection procedure, the only quantity which distinguishes between eigenstates of an observable are their eigenvalues. This is why a measurement in the projection procedure must return the eigenvalue of the eigenstate. In a more general setting, in which the state of one subsystem interacts with another to perform a measurement, the result need only be a (non-degenerate) correlation of the states of the observing subsystem with the eigenstates of the observable in the observed subsystem. This correlation allows one to infer the state of one system from the state of the other. Since the eigenstates of the observed subsystem are characterized by their eigenvalues, one may say that the measurement has returned the eigenvalue, in the sense that the eigenvalue can be inferred from knowledge of the state of the observing subsystem. This is however an abstraction: the eigenvalue is not an extant physical quantity. The physical result of a measurement is the correlation of the states of subsystems.
The second criterion-that if the measurement is immediately repeated, the same result is obtained with certainty-is a requirement that the measurement be non-destructive [DeG73] . That is, if the observed subsystem is in an eigenstate of the observable, this eigenstate must be preserved after the interaction, so that it may be measured again and found to give the same result. This rules out, as measurements, interactions which correlate the state of the observing subsystem with the state of the observed system before the interaction but leave it disturbed after the interaction. As one might expect, this restricts the interaction terms that may be classified as measurements in the projection procedure sense. This is significant because it reveals that the projection procedure is an idealization of the process of measurement. There are interactions which are considered measurements in experimental practice that are not measurements in this sense.
A further idealization of the process of measurement in the projection procedure is that it is instantaneous. This feature is not retained in the model system: necessarily all measurements implemented by interaction require finite duration. The implications of this regarding observables will be discussed below. I remark here that this is a profound departure from the projection procedure in both its Copenhagen and Everett incarnations. It has been lamented [Sch35, vNe55, Kuc81] that one of the most serious failings of the quantum mechanical formalism, especially from the perspective of relativity, is the fact that measurements take place at a precise instant of time. This is where this begins to change. Measurements as projections, and as results computed from expectation values, take place at a precise instant of time. Measurements as interactions require duration.
In the post-Everett view, where the outcome of a measurement is a correlation between subsystems, the second criterion is a question of conditional probability. One confirms that it is satisfied by using the Page-Wootters interpretation[PaW83-93]. One requires two observing subsystems. Sequentially, each interacts with the observed subsystem establishing correlation with the observed subsystem. The question is then posed: given the result of the first of the measurement, is the probability certain that the result of the second is the same? The answer is yes, by construction. When the first observing subsystem interacts with the observed subsystem, it establishes a correlation which distinguishes the different eigenstates of the observed subsystem. In the manner in which one handles conditional probabilities, one discards all the states except for the one whose correlation reflects the given result of the first measurement. The second observing subsystem then interacts only with an eigenstate of the observable, not with a superposition, and establishes a correlation which is the same as that of the first subsystem. The only thing that could go wrong would be if the observed subsystem is not still in an eigenstate of the observable, but the measurement-interaction is chosen so that this cannot happen.
Consider a model of a measurement of the momentum p 1 of particle-1 in the example above. We introduce a second free particle, particle-2, which interacts with particle-1 through the measurement-interaction (cf. [vNe55] )
Since the interaction couples to the observable, it will preserve the eigenstates of the observable through the measurement-interaction. Here, a(q 0 ) is a smooth function which vanishes outside the interval 0 < q 0 < T and for which
It can be viewed as a phenomenological summary of a more detailed process by which particle-1 and particle-2 are brought together to interact. The full super-Hamiltonian is then
This problem can be exactly solved, using for example canonical transformations [And92] (cf. also [Kuc80] ). Define
The super-Hamiltonian H with the interaction term is related to the superHamiltonian H 0 = p 0 + p 2 1 + p 2 2 without interaction term by a time-dependent canonical transformation C q 0 ,
where
The solutions |Ψ of H are given in terms of those |Ψ 0 of H 0 by |Ψ = C q 0 |Ψ 0 .
Assume that particle-1 is initially in an eigenstate of momentum p 1 , |k 1 , and that particle-2 is in an eigenstate of momentum p 2 , |k 2 2 , so that
The coordinate representation of the solution |Ψ is
The state evolves smoothly from |k 1 |k 2 2 before q 0 = 0 to e iφ(k,k 2 ) |k 1 |k 2 −k 2 after q 0 = T . A phase φ(k, k 2 ) arises in the evolution and, explicitly,
0 . The state of particle-2 is correlated with that of particle-1 after the evolution, and the eigenstate of particle-1 has not been disturbed. A measurement has been performed.
If particle-1 were initially in the Gaussian superposition of momentumeigenstates (6), the measurement would have produced the smooth transition to a superposition of correlated states (πa/2)
Suppose one introduces a second observer, particle-3, in the same initial state |k 2 3 as particle-2, and couples it to particle-1 for an interval after q 0 = T through a term analogous to (8). Given that the result of the first measurement is k ′ , i.e. the correlation |k
, the result of the second measurement will be the correlated state |k
The same measurement result is obtained, as required.
Let us now consider the role of observables. In the absence of the interaction term (8), both p 1 and p 2 commute with the super-Hamiltonian H 0 and are observables. In the presence of the interaction, p 2 is no longer an observable. This is consistent with the fact that the initial state of particle-2, which is characterized by its eigenvalue with respect to p 2 , changes during the interaction. Even though p 2 is not an observable, a modification gives an observablep
The full quantum wavefunction (12) over the whole history of the universe has the eigenvalue k 2 forp 2 and the eigenvalue k for the observable p 1 . These eigenvalues label the state, and they are constants throughout the evolution of the state. Nevertheless a measurement has been made. There is no loss of dynamics because one has chosen to work in the frozen formalism. A closer examination of the relation between observables and dynamics will be illuminating. Note thatp 2 agrees with p 2 when q 0 < 0. For this restricted portion of the universe, p 2 is an observable in the sense that it commutes with the super-Hamiltonian, and it can be used to label states in this region. This suggests that it is useful to distinguish between a restricted observable which commutes with the super-Hamiltonian in some region and a global observable which commutes with the super-Hamiltonian everywhere.
As participants in the universe, we do not of course know the full superHamiltonian which describes it. There will be measurements made in the future which we cannot anticipate now. Since we only discover the details of the super-Hamiltonian of the universe as we go along, we cannot know the global observables which commute with the super-Hamiltonian of our universe. When we say that the states of subsystems we observe are in eigenstates of some observables, they are in eigenstates of restricted observables. For some period of time, those observables commute with the super-Hamiltonian of the universe, and their eigenstates are unchanging with respect to eigenstates of other observables that also commute with the super-Hamiltonian.
To elaborate on this further, consider the observable p 1 which is being measured. In the example here, it is both an observable in the sense that it commutes with the super-Hamiltonian and in the sense that a correlation with its eigenstates is established during the measurement-interaction with particle-2. I want to emphasize that it is not necessary that p 1 commute with the super-Hamiltonian for all q 0 , so long as it does so in the neighborhood of the period of measurement.
Suppose one considers the measurement of p 1 when the state of particle-1 at q 0 = 0 is the gaussian superposition (6). One could add a q 1 -dependent term to the super-Hamiltonian which evolves some initial state of particle-1 into the gaussian superposition and turns off before q 0 = 0, when the measurement begins. Or, one could add such a term some time after q 0 = T when the measurement is complete, and the final state of particle-1 in each correlated state of the superposition would evolve away from a momentum eigenstate. In each case, the momentum of particle-1 in the gaussian superposition state at q 0 = 0 would still be measured, but p 1 would only be a restricted observable. It would not commute with the super-Hamiltonian if there were q 1 -dependent terms present. Not being a global observable means that the eigenvalue of p 1 could not be used as a quantum number for the wavefunction of the universe, but this is not a serious loss. If one's primary concern is with predictions of the outcomes of measurement, restricted observables are more relevant than global ones.
The nature of observables can be still more closely investigated. At each instant q 0 = t, the state of particle-2 is instantaneously an eigenstate of the self-adjoint operator p 2 with eigenvalue k 2 − A(t)k. In the ordinary quantum mechanical sense, p 2 is an observable. One can compute expectation values of it at any time q 0 , and one thinks of these as predictions of the outcomes of possible measurements. Now, p 2 is not a global observable, and it doesn't commute with H at q 0 = t when 0 < t < T , so it isn't always a restricted observable. Nevertheless, just as q 1 at time q 0 = t, in the first example, was made into a global observable above by evolving it with the Hamiltonian, p 2 can be made a global observable by applying the canonical transformation
This gives a family of observables p 2t which reduce to the operator p 2 at time q 0 = t of which particle-2 is instantaneously an eigenstate. As the state of the system evolves through the measurement, the eigenstate of particle-2 changes at each instant as the observable of which it is the eigenstate changes. In ordinary quantum mechanics, when one speaks of the self-adjoint operator p 2 as an observable, one is referring to p 2t . Incidentally, this answers Kuchar's criticism that the Page-Wootters conditional probability interpretation does not give the correct answer for propagators [Kuc92] . The observables for the position at two distinct instants of time are different, as given by (4). If, at time q 0 = T , one wants to predict the probability of finding the particle at some location at a later instant q 0 = T ′ , one must compute the conditional probability that the particle is in an eigenstate of q 1T ′ . If one uses q 1T as the position observable for all time, the particle will not appear to move, as Kuchar rightly argues.
It is generally true that an operator at an instant of time can be promoted into a global observable, and hence one has a family of observables parametrized by the time. These are Rovelli's evolving constants of the motion[Rov89-91]. As these observables change, the eigenstates associated with them change as well. This change embodies the evolution of states.
One may ask whether these observables are all physically measurable. That is, can one introduce an observing subsystem that will correlate with the momentum of particle-2 at time q 0 = t for 0 < t < T ? My answer is no. While one may formally calculate expectation values for the momentum p 2t at these times, these calculations do not refer to the results of any physical experiment that can be done, in the projection procedure sense. There are two related difficulties. First, all physical measurements require finite duration in order to establish correlations between the observing and the observed subsystems. This is itself a subject requiring further elaboration, but for the moment suffice it to say that, since the eigenvalue of the operator p 2 is changing, an attempted measurement can at best measure an averaged value and not the specific momentum at time q 0 = t. Moreover, one expects that no coupling exists which will leave the changing value of p 2 undisturbed, so that the measurement of p 1 is unaffected. Secondly, because p 2 is dynamically changing, it is impossible to arrange that a second measurement will find the same result with certainty. One can couple to the observable which corresponds to the instantaneous momentum eigenstate of particle-2 at time q 0 = t, but as it will obtain an average result over a different interval than the first measurement, the results will in general be different. This would not then be a measurement in the projection procedure sense.
Thus, only restricted observables can be physically measured in the projection procedure sense. One is led to the conclusion that the assumptions about the nature of measurement that lie at the foundation of the projection procedure are too idealized. By postulating instantaneous nondisruptive measurement, they both exclude physically relevant measurementinteractions and allow computations for the outcomes of experiments that cannot be realized. It is evident that further work on measurement theory outside the projection procedure framework is necessary.
To close one final loose-end, consider whether the non-self-adjoint observable G (7) can be physically observed. Mathematically, the answer would seem to be yes: one uses a coupling analogous to (8) with p 1 replaced by G. This would establish a correlation between the state of particle-2 and the G-eigenstate of particle-1. There is however a difficulty. Since G is a complex operator, it is not evident that there exists a physical device which can realize the proposed coupling. This serves to emphasize a very important point. In the laboratory, we are restricted to a handful of possible interactions. One must bear in mind that these are the building blocks from which we must ultimately build our super-Hamiltonian.
The following picture of dynamics in the frozen formalism can be assembled from the foregoing discussion. The full quantum state representing the "wavefunction of the universe" is fixed once the initial conditions and the super-Hamiltonian are given. This includes all measurements that will be made during the course of the universe. Dynamical evolution is a process that takes place in the form of changes in the decomposition of the full state into subsystem eigenstates. The wavefunction of the universe need not be expressed as a product state of eigenstates of its global observables. It may of course be represented as a superposition of such eigenstates. More generally it may be represented in terms of eigenstates of operators which are observables only in restricted regions of the universe, or in terms of eigenstates of families of global observables parametrized by the time. When the wavefunction of the universe is expressed in such a fashion, one finds that as the collection of observables used to decompose the state change, the superposition of eigenstates change. This is what gives us the impression of dynamical evolution: it is the changing collection of correlations amongst the eigenstates of restricted observables that constitutes what we observe.
The self-adjoint operators that we speak of in ordinary quantum mechan-ics as observables are members of families of global observables parametrized by the time. Because any measurement made through interactions requires finite duration to establish correlations between the observing and the observed subsystems, only restricted observables which commute with the superHamiltonian through the period of measurement are physically measurable, in the projection procedure sense. In particular, this means that one can compute expectation values for many self-adjoint operators which do not refer to the outcomes of physically realizable experiments. If one is interested in physics, care must be taken with the use of expectation values. More importantly, one must appreciate that the projection procedure, which so strongly colors our perception of quantum mechanics, overly idealizes measurement as instantaneous and non-destructive. Recognizing that a proper description of measurements within the quantum formalism requires interactions of finite duration is a first step towards resolving the long-standing conflict over the role of time in quantum mechanics and relativity.
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